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The Threat of Deepfakes in
Litigation: Raising the Authentication
Bar to Combat Falsehood
Agnieszka McPeak*
ABSTRACT
Deepfakes are all over the internet—from shape-shifting
comedians and incoherent politicians to disturbingly realistic fake
pornography. Emerging technology makes it easier than ever to create a
convincing deepfake. What used to take significant time and money to
develop is now widely available, often for free, thanks to rapid advances
in deepfake technology.
Deepfakes threaten individual rights and even democracy. But
their impact on litigation should not be overlooked. The US adversarial
system of justice is built on a foundation of seeking out the truth to arrive
at a just result. The Federal Rules of Evidence serve as an important
framework for this truth-seeking mission, and the authentication rules,
in particular, should play a key role in preventing deepfake evidence
from corrupting the legal process.
This Article looks at the unique threat of deepfakes and how the
authentication rules under the Federal Rules of Evidence can adapt
to help deal with these new challenges. It examines authentication
standards that have emerged for social media evidence and suggests a
middle-ground approach that redefines the quantity and quality of
circumstantial evidence necessary for a reasonable jury to determine
authenticity in the age of deepfakes. This middle-ground approach may
raise the evidentiary bar in some cases, but it seeks to balance efficiency
with the need to combat falsehood in the litigation process.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION

The US adversarial system of justice is built on a foundation of
seeking out the truth to arrive at a just result. In both civil and criminal
cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence serve as a final gatekeeper to
funnel potential evidence to that which is relevant, authentic, and not
unfairly prejudicial.1 The Federal Rules of Evidence have always
had to grapple with keeping out false information, from forgeries to
photoshop.2 Deepfakes, however, are emerging as a new, sophisticated
form of realistic-seeming fabrications. Deepfake technology is rapidly
improving in accuracy, speed, and volume. Doctored images that
formerly required significant time and money to create can now be
made in moments on a smartphone app by almost anyone.3 As deepfake
technology rapidly advances, the naked eye will eventually be unable to
discern the subtle clues that indicate an image, video, or audio clip is
fake. Even experts struggle with ascertaining the veracity of a potential
deepfake.4 While videos and audio remain powerful pieces of evidence,
their authenticity will be hard to gauge in the era of deepfakes.
1.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 101; FED. R. EVID. 102; FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID.
403; FED. R. EVID. 901.
2.
See Zachariah B. Parry, Digital Manipulation and Photographic Evidence: Defrauding
the Courts One Thousand Words at a Time, 2009 U. ILL . J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 178–79 (2009).
3.
See Robert Chesney & Danielle K. Citron, Disinformation on Steroids, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/deep-fake-disinformation-steroids
[https://perma.cc/D8U6-NVKX]; see, e.g., Anya Zhukova, 7 Best Deepfake Apps and Websites,
ONLINE TECH TIPS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.online-tech-tips.com/cool-websites/7-best-deepfake-apps-and-websites/ [https://perma.cc/52WZ-RZ9M].
4.
See Chesney & Citron, supra note 3; see also Drew Harwell, Top AI Researchers Race
to Detect ‘Deepfake’ Videos: ‘We Are Outgunned,’ WASH. POST (June 12, 2019, 4:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/12/top-ai-researchers-race-detect-deepfakevideos-we-are-outgunned/ [https://perma.cc/2V2V-SVMK].
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This Article explores the potential impact of deepfakes on the
litigation process. It first discusses why deepfakes pose a new and
unique threat in litigation and analyzes how the Federal Rules of
Evidence attempt to weed out fake content, particularly as to the
authentication of social media evidence. It concludes that the Federal
Rules of Evidence are generally equipped to handle deepfakes as a new
frontier of false evidence, but a higher bar for authentication should
be considered in many cases. However, an across-the-board high
evidentiary bar may not be warranted, especially in light of cost and
efficiency concerns. This Article thus recommends that a middle-ground
approach should be used to provide for both flexibility and adequate
information to allow a reasonable jury to better gauge the authenticity
of potential deepfake evidence.
II. THE UNIQUE THREAT OF DEEPFAKES
With its seemingly endless capacity for creativity, the internet
has produced some hilariously realistic celebrity deepfakes. Comedian
Bill Hader shape-shifts to take on the faces of the famous actors he is
mimicking during a David Letterman interview.5 Former President
Barack Obama gives an obscenity-laced speech about the threat of
misinformation to democracy and ends with the plea to “stay woke,
bitches.”6 Viral videos of cute babies are doctored to show Elon Musk’s
face superimposed on the baby’s face, leading to predictably creepy
results.7 A search for Nicholas Cage on Reddit produces countless
videos of his face added to clips of famous films in which he never
starred.8

5.
Jon Blistein, Watch Bill Hader Become Tom Cruise, Seth Rogen in Eerie Deepfake
Video, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 13, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturenews/bill-hader-tom-cruise-seth-rogen-deepfake-871154/ [https://perma.cc/5L99-PXD8].
6.
Todd Spangler, Jordan Peele Teams with BuzzFeed for Obama Fake-News Awareness
Video (Watch), VARIETY (Apr. 17, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/jordanpeele-obama-fake-news-video-buzzfeed-1202755517/ [https://perma.cc/S8G8-WRR4]. The video
was created by BuzzFeed and comedian Jordan Peele, who did the voice impersonation used in the
video. Id. University of Washington researchers have developed an AI tool that allows them to
easily manipulate a video of Barack Obama to swap out the speech he is giving, producing a
realistic deepfake video. Adam Mann, Deepfake AI: Our Dystopian Present, LIVE SCI. (Sept. 30,
2019), https://www.livescience.com/deepfake-ai.html [https://perma.cc/HU3C-XP7B].
7.
See Amanda Kooser, This Elon Musk Deepfake Baby Video Shattered My Brain, CNET
(May 10, 2019, 12:23 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/this-elon-musk-deepfake-baby-video-shattered-my-brain/ [https://perma.cc/QP33-PWM7].
8.
See Sam Haysom, People Are Using Face-Swapping Tech to Add Nicholas Cage
to Random Movies and What Is 2018, MASHABLE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/31/nicolas-cage-face-swapping-deepfakes/ [https://perma.cc/KJH6-FDQM].
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The more disturbing reality, however, is that the vast
majority of deepfakes are pornography.9 Female celebrity faces are
being digitally added to pornographic content, creating deepfake
porn videos.10 Kristen Bell,11 Scarlett Johansson,12 and Taylor Swift13
have all been victims of deepfake pornography. But the deepfake
pornography phenomenon is not limited to celebrities. Australian law
graduate Noelle Martin discovered that her public social media images
were used to create explicit photos and videos of her.14 In addition to
the emotional trauma they endure, victims of deepfake pornography
suffer stigmatization, reputational harm, harassment, and even
blackmail.15 Women who are victims of abusive deepfake pornography
already know the serious impact deepfake technology can have on
individual lives.
The threat of deepfakes is amplified by their accuracy,
ease of creation, and impact on viewers. Deepfakes are created
using artificial intelligence and deep-learning technology.16 These
deepfake applications use real images, audio, and video to generate

9.
Cleo Abram, The Most Urgent Threat of Deepfakes Isn’t Politics. It’s Porn., V OX (June
8, 2020, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21284005/urgent-threat-deepfakes-politicsporn-kristen-bell [https://perma.cc/3855-N8W5].
10.
See id.
11.
Claudia Willen, Kristen Bell Says She Was ‘Shocked’ to Learn That Her Face Was Used
in a Pornographic Deepfake Video, INSIDER (June 11, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.insider.com/kristen-bell-face-pornographic-deepfake-video-response-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/7FW4Y5B6].
12.
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Scarlett Johansson Says Trying to Stop People Making
Deepfake Porn Videos of Her Is a ‘Lost Cause,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 31, 2018, 4:51 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/scarlett-johansson-stopping-deepfake-porn-of-me-is-a-lostcause-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/HE4M-S92V].
13.
Ian Morris, Deepfake Porn Banned by Reddit and Pornhub After Taylor Swift and
Meghan Markle Clips Emerge Online, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ianmorris/2018/02/07/deepfake-porn-banned-by-reddit-and-pornhub-after-taylor-swift-andmeghan-markle-clips-emerge-online/#5a32524a48ea [https://perma.cc/APX7-7CR3].
14.
See Daniella Scott, Deepfake Porn Nearly Ruined My Life, ELLE (June 2,
2020),
https://www.elle.com/uk/life-and-culture/a30748079/deepfake-porn/
[https://perma.cc/
4D27-2JDL].
15.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1891–92, 1915,
1924–28 (2019) (explaining the harms of deepfake pornography, including how victims can be
manipulated by perpetrators to perform certain acts or pay money to combat widespread
dissemination of deepfakes).
16.
Kashyap Vyas, Generative Adversarial Networks: The Tech Behind Deepfake and
FaceApp, INTERESTING ENG’G (Aug. 12, 2019), https://interestingengineering.com/generative-adversarial-networks-the-tech-behind-deepfake-and-faceapp
[https://perma.cc/CAC5-AJ7T].
In
particular, Generative Adversarial Networks, or GANs, are a form of deep learning that creates,
or generates, unique images using data inputs. Outputs then check themselves against the
reference data set to help improve realism and accuracy of the generated images. Id.
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realistic-looking fakes.17 While movie studios have used sophisticated
technology for special effects in film for years, the proliferation of
deepfake apps, which provide easy access to sophisticated editing tools,
makes deepfakes a new and troubling development.18 Face-swapping
apps and fake video apps, like FakeApp, which allow an average user
to create a realistic fake video in minutes for little or no cost, make the
democratization of deepfakes possible.19 This technology is advancing
quickly, prompting the quality of deepfakes to continue to increase.20
Fewer people will be able to detect the visual or aural clues of
deepfakes.21 Deepfake creators will need increasingly smaller data sets
to create convincing deepfakes as deep-learning technology advances.
At the same time, the internet spurs the swift and broad dissemination
of this technology, and more people will have access to the tools for
creating deepfakes.22
The harmful impact of deepfakes also permeates politics.
Millions of people viewed a video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
appearing to slur her speech while speaking at a press conference.23 The
video was circulated widely on social media, including through a tweet
by President Donald Trump.24 In Malaysia, a rising-star politician was
mired in a sex tape scandal after a video surfaced purporting to show
him engaging in illegal homosexual activity.25 Authorities and experts,
using facial recognition technology and other forensics, could not
establish who actually appears in the video, and all charges were
17.
See Ben Dickson, What Is a Deepfake?, PCMAG (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://www.pcmag.com/news/what-is-a-deepfake [https://perma.cc/SF9M-9HTA].
18.
See id.
19.
See Kevin Reilly & Steve Kovach, Face-Swapping Videos Could Lead to More ‘Fake
News,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fakeapp-lets-people-make-fake-videos-deepfakes-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/7JW4-KW2G].
20.
Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Detecting Deepfakes, TECHSHOW,
https://www.techshow.com/2020/01/detecting-deepfakes/
[https://perma.cc/JC5C-D9S5]
(last
visited Dec. 7, 2020).
21.
See id.
22.
See Reilly & Kovach, supra note 19.
23.
Jason Abbruzzese, Doctored Pelosi Videos Offer a Warning: The Internet Isn’t Ready
for 2020, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/doctoredpelosi-videos-offer-warning-internet-isn-t-ready-2020-n1010011 [https://perma.cc/WU4Y-HYNV].
24.
Russell Berman, For Nancy Pelosi, This Is All Just Déjà Vu, ATLANTIC
(May 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/trump-pelosi-video/590233/
[https://perma.cc/C2LR-KES9]. That video was a “shallow fake” that did not rely on deep-learning
technology; instead, it involved slowing down the speed of the original and manipulating the audio
so that the pitch of the voice remains realistic. See Abbruzzese, supra note 23.
25.
Jarni Blakkarly, A Gay Sex Tape Is Threatening to End the Political Careers of Two
Men in Malaysia, SBS NEWS, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/a-gay-sex-tape-is-threatening-to-endthe-political-careers-of-two-men-in-malaysia [https://perma.cc/KN2J-ZAX2] (last updated June
17, 2019).
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dropped.26 Nonetheless, the video scandal caused significant political
fallout.27 As a whole, experts have warned that, if unchecked, deepfakes
could undermine democracy by amplifying falsehoods and sowing
discord.28
Deepfakes have also surfaced in litigation,29 and lawyers will
need to take their role in combatting deepfakes seriously as the law
tries to deal with this emerging issue.30 Deepfake evidence has already
turned up as a key issue in some cases.31 For example, a mother in a
British court sought to use her husband’s threatening audio comments
against him in a child custody dispute.32 Using metadata analysis, the
husband was able to show the audio file was a fake, created using
software that falsified his voice.33 While the fake audio file was detected
in that case, it serves as a cautionary tale of the power of deepfakes as
a source of false evidence.34
In the litigation context, two aspects of deepfakes pose a
challenge. First, deepfakes may be convincing, compelling, and difficult
to detect. Second, people may doubt unaltered content simply
because they know realistic deepfakes are possible. First, while the

26.
Malaysia’s Attorney-General Drops Sex-Video Case; Minister Denounces Plot, REUTERS
(Jan. 9, 2020, 4:33 AM), https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-politics-idUSKBN1Z817V
[https://perma.cc/PF4X-2DW3]; see also A. Ananthalakshmi, Malaysian Police Say Political Leader
Behind Gay Sex Tape Allegations, REUTERS (July 17, 2019, 1:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-politics/malaysian-police-say-political-leader-behind-gay-sex-tape-allegationsidUSKCN1UD0OF [https://perma.cc/3RW6-G9GB] (noting that the video appears to be authentic,
but facial recognition could not confirm the identity of all parties).
27.
See Ananthalakshmi, supra note 26; see also Blakkarly, supra note 25.
28.
See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy,
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753, 1769, 1777 (2019) (noting how deepfakes
have beneficial applications in education, art, and autonomy); Chesney & Citron, supra note 3
(describing the foreign policy implications of deepfakes).
29.
See Matt Reynolds, The Judicial System Needs to Learn How to Combat the Threat of
‘Deepfake’ Evidence, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Feb. 28, 2020, 5:11 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba-techshow-experts-warn-of-deepfake-threats-to-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/HQ8Z-44SJ].
30.
See Jason Tashea, As Deepfakes Make It Harder to Discern Truth, Lawyers Can Be
Gatekeepers, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Feb. 26, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/as-deepfakes-make-it-harder-to-discern-truth-lawyers-can-be-gatekeepers
[https://perma.cc/54CY-NNXP].
31.
See Matt Reynolds, Courts and Lawyers Struggle with Growing Prevalence of
Deepfakes, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (June 9, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/courts-and-lawyers-struggle-with-growing-prevalence-of-deepfakes
[https://perma.cc/7ALFPKVW].
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
See id.
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democratization of deepfakes has its upsides,35 it also brings about a
new and troubling era of disinformation. In the free speech context, the
general approach has been to assume that the cure for false speech is
more speech.36 But the flood of information online—real, fake, or in
between—has shown that individuals are not necessarily able to
access counterspeech or otherwise meaningfully seek out the truth.37
Similarly, in the context of jurors, deepfakes may soon go beyond
a layperson’s ability to visually ascertain whether an image or
video purports to be what it seems.38 Second, the proliferation of
disinformation makes people question their ability to trust anything.
Social media disinformation has already made it harder for people to
distinguish truth from fiction online.39 Thus, in addition to the risk of
deepfakes being perceived as real, the knowledge that deepfakes are out
there undermines belief in the authenticity of undoctored images. In
other words, people no longer believe anything is real.40
Many people value visual perception above other indicators of
41
truth. Images are powerful, and social media has further elevated
videos and images as sources of factual information. More Americans
get their news from social media than print media.42 With Instagram,
TikTok, and other video- and photo-heavy platforms gaining market
share, social media trends continue to elevate visual content—and
35.
See Jessica Silbey & Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960,
960 (2019). Notably, the democratization of deepfakes has its upsides, like education, accessibility,
and freedom of expression. Id. at 960–61; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1769 (noting
how deepfakes have beneficial applications in education, art, and autonomy).
36.
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 822 (2010) (noting how the rational audience and
concept of counterspeech remain important in First-Amendment jurisprudence).
37.
See generally Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 461 (2008) (noting
how the US system clings to the jury’s role as judge of credibility despite technological
advances); John Villasenor, Artificial Intelligence, Deepfakes, and the Uncertain Future of Truth,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/02/14/artificial-intelligence-deepfakes-and-the-uncertain-future-of-truth/ [https://perma.cc/WC89-W73R].
38.
See Villasenor, supra note 37 (noting the need for public awareness about deepfakes).
39.
See Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/the-future-oftruth-and-misinformation-online/ [https://perma.cc/VH2F-M23Q].
40.
See Riana Pfefferkorn, ‘Deepfakes’: A New Challenge for Trial Courts, NWSIDEBAR
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://nwsidebar.wsba.org/2019/03/13/deepfakes-a-new-challenge-for-trialcourts/ [https://perma.cc/A8WL-N2WV].
41.
See Carolyn Purnell, Do We All Still Agree that “Seeing Is Believing”?, PSYCH. TODAY
(June 23, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/making-sense/202006/do-we-all-stillagree-seeing-is-believing [https://perma.cc/GK2H-B7Q7].
42.
Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-mediaoutpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ [https://perma.cc/5B94-6B46].
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videos in particular—over other formats.43 But social media also has
become fertile ground for the spread of deepfakes.44 And, as the public
becomes more aware of the risk of being fooled by realistic deepfakes,
they also begin to mistrust authentic videos too. Take, for example, a
video of Gabon’s president Ali Bongo. Bongo, who suffered a stroke and
was out of the public eye for months, was rumored to be very ill or
dead.45 The video, meant to quash public fears, was attacked as a
deepfake that further confirmed speculation about his poor health.46
Controversy over the video even led to an unsuccessful military coup.47
To date, speculation continues about whether the video was a deepfake,
but the uncertainty and mistrust it spawned serve as a cautionary
tale about the public’s inability to gauge authenticity in the age of
deepfakes.48 New technology allows deepfakes to become even trickier
to detect. Seeing is no longer believing, and viewers may now question
even real content.49
III. DEEPFAKES & THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In litigation, deepfakes threaten to undermine the court’s
fact-finding mission. First, if a deepfake is admitted as authentic
evidence, it can undermine the court’s truth-seeking mission.
Deepfakes can easily become outcome determinative, given that video
evidence in the courtroom is impactful and can profoundly influence
individual perception of events.50 Second, deepfakes also undermine the
public’s ability to trust authentic videos. Judges and juries may be
skeptical of believing what they see in a real, undoctored video because
they know images are now easily manipulated. In other words, the
knowledge that deepfakes are out there and hard to spot may make
fact-finders question whether they can even believe real footage.
Fortunately, proper use of the authentication rules in the
Federal Rules of Evidence can alleviate both concerns. The key, as
43.
See Deep Patel, 12 Social Media Trends to Watch in 2020, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 20,
2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/343863 [https://perma.cc/7ZKR-MV89].
44.
See, e.g., Ali Breland, The Bizarre and Terrifying Case of the “Deepfake” Video That
Helped Bring an African Nation to the Brink, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/deepfake-gabon-ali-bongo/ [https://perma.cc/9VSS-FD8G].
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
See Janosch Delcker, Welcome to the Age of Uncertainty, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:50
PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/deepfake-videos-the-future-uncertainty/ [https://perma.cc/
LSD5-RXB3].
49.
Purnell, supra note 41; see also Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1785.
50.
See Purnell, supra note 41.
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this Article will demonstrate, is to employ a sufficient standard of
authenticity under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.
A. How the Federal Rules of Evidence Weed Out Fakes
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is “to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the
truth and securing a just determination.”51 They embody the principle
that an adversarial system of justice is the ideal mechanism for
reaching the truth through litigation. The proponent of evidence bears
the burden to establish relevance and authenticity.52 Other limitations
also apply, such as to hearsay evidence and the balancing of the
evidence’s probative value with unfair prejudice.53 But even disputed
evidence may be admissible, as opposing parties can present competing
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise seek out the truth
throughout the litigation process. It is then for an impartial judge or
jury, considering all the evidence, to decide the truth.
One of the fundamental underpinnings of the US legal system is
that a jury of the litigants’ peers is best equipped to find the truth
based on the evidence presented. Unfortunately, individuals may now
have a harder time detecting truth from lies online,54 and deepfakes
further challenge the jury’s ability to perform its truth-seeking role.
Authentication requirements, thus, must serve as a crucial roadblock
to the use of deepfakes in litigation.
1. Authentication of Electronically Stored Information
With the advent of electronically stored information (ESI),
courts had to consider whether existing admissibility rules were
sufficient to address ESI as a new category of potential evidence. In
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.,55 the US District Court for

51.
FED. R. EVID. 102.
52.
FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requiring that the proponent of the evidence show that the
evidence is what it purports to be); FED. R. EVID. 401 (requiring that evidence must have the
tendency to make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation more or less probable).
53.
FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 802. Hearsay is defined in Federal
Rule of Evidence 801, FED. R. EVID. 801, with exceptions spelled out in subsequent rules, FED. R.
EVID. 802. Rule 403 contains the balancing test that allows otherwise admissible evidence to be
excluded on the basis of unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403.
54.
See Raina Ducklow & Bud Mortenson, Why People Are Better at Lying Online than
Telling a Lie Face-to-Face, SCI. DAILY (May 5, 2009), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/05/090503203738.htm [https://perma.cc/LP64-VCX6].
55.
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).

442

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:2:433

the District of Maryland identified the ways in which existing
admissibility rules apply to ESI.56 The Lorraine opinion first provides
an overview of evidentiary hurdles that parties must cross before ESI
can be admitted, including relevance considerations under Rule 401.57
Additionally, relevant ESI must survive the rules prohibiting hearsay,
the original writing rule, and the Rule 403 balancing of probative value
against the danger of unfair prejudice.58
Even if otherwise admissible under the Rules, ESI evidence still
must be authentic. Authentication is outlined in Rule 901, which states
that the proponent of evidence “must produce evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”59
Parties may satisfy this requirement by presenting the testimony of a
witness with knowledge60 or by using the distinctive characteristics of
the evidence, such as “the appearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together
with all the circumstances.”61 Authentication can also be established
with evidence of a process or system, by showing that it “produces
an accurate result.”62 For authentication of voice audio, Rule
901(b)(5) requires “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice—whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
56.
Id. at 541; see also Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi & Alexander W. Major, Back
to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility
of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 362–63 (2009).
57.
Lorraine, 242 F.R.D. at 538 (describing the first two admissibility steps as “(1) is the
ESI relevant as determined by Rule 401 (does it have any tendency to make some fact that is of
consequence to the litigation more or less probable than it otherwise would be); (2) if relevant
under 401, is it authentic as required by Rule 901(a) (can the proponent show that the ESI is what
it purports to be)”).
58.
Id. (describing the remaining admissibility steps as “(3) if the ESI is offered for its
substantive truth, is it hearsay as defined by Rule 801, and if so, is it covered by an applicable
exception (Rules 803, 804 and 807); (4) is the form of the ESI that is being offered as evidence an
original or duplicate under the original writing rule, or if not, is there admissible secondary
evidence to prove the content of the ESI (Rules 1001-1008); and (5) is the probative value of the
ESI substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or one of the other factors identified
by Rule 403, such that it should be excluded despite its relevance.”).
59.
FED. R. EVID. 901(a). Notably, Rule 104 also addresses preliminary matters more
broadly and allows admission of evidence to occur in two ways. FED. R. EVID. 104. First, the court
can make the preliminary decision as to whether evidence is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
Under this path, the court “is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.” Id. The
second path derives from Rule 104(b): “Relevance that Depends on a Fact.” FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
Under this path, the fact-finder must be presented with evidence to support that a particular fact
exists, and that evidence must be admissible. Id. Of these two paths, it is Rule 104(b)’s “relevance
that depends on a fact” that often applies to authenticity determinations. See Grimm et al., supra
note 56, at 364.
60.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
61.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
62.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
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recording—based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
that connect it with the alleged speaker.”63 Proper authentication of
digital videos or photographs may require detailed evidence about chain
of custody, such as how illegal pornographic content was retrieved
from a defendant’s computer and subsequently stored.64 Testimony of
someone who accessed content from the internet is insufficient to
attribute content to a particular user, without “personal knowledge of
who maintains the website, who authored the documents, or the
accuracy of their contents.”65
The threshold for making a prima facie showing of authenticity
is not high, however, and it suffices to merely offer “a foundation from
which a jury could reasonably find that the evidence is what the
proponent says it is.”66 This burden is slight.67 Ultimately, the
proponent of digital evidence can usually authenticate that evidence
with other admissible evidence supporting its genuineness.68 This basic
approach continues to be used for digital evidence as well.
While courts have been able to apply the existing Federal
Rules of Evidence to ESI, the rise of deepfakes marks a new era of
altered and fabricated evidence, and a higher bar may be necessary.69
The technology to create deepfakes will continue to outpace the
knowledge and ability of judges, lawyers, and laypeople alike.70 A
greater responsibility will fall on lawyers to challenge evidence that is
a deepfake. Further, because the proponent of the evidence bears the
burden of establishing authenticity, litigants will have to contend with
their own attempts to rely on favorable evidence that may be difficult
63.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).
64.
See United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
government properly authenticated child pornography taken off of the defendant’s computer by
presenting detailed evidence as to the chain of custody, specifically how the images were retrieved
from the defendant’s computers).
65.
Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
66.
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting 5 FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 901.02[1] (2020)) (discussing authentication of emails).
67.
See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he burden of
proof for authentication is slight.”).
68.
See Daniel Capra, Authenticating Digital Evidence, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (2017).
69.
Cf. Grimm et al., supra note 56, at 366. (“As electronic evidence becomes more
ubiquitous at trial, it is critical for courts to start demanding that counsel give more in terms of
authentication—and counsel who fail to meet courts' expectations will do so at their own peril.”).
70.
Cf. id. (“But it is also a very real possibility that someone inept with computers may
also alter electronic evidence so as to make it unusable or inadmissible. Therefore, as technology
continues creating relevant evidence while, simultaneously, outpacing the working knowledge and
ability of most lawyers and judges to deal with it, ensuring proper authentication of electronic
evidence becomes a greater responsibility for attorneys and judges alike.”).
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to prove is real. For example, in 2002, the US Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition considered the constitutionality of an
anti-child pornography statute that attempted to prohibit images that
merely “appear to be” or “convey the impression of” a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.71 When arguing in favor of the statute,
the government emphasized the challenges of proving a pornographic
image contains a real person and is not a fake.72 The statute thereby
contemplates banning both real and virtual pornography: “As imaging
technology improves, Congress found, it becomes more difficult to prove
that a particular picture was produced using actual children. To ensure
that defendants possessing child pornography using real minors
cannot evade prosecution, Congress extended the ban to virtual child
pornography.”73 Nonetheless, the Court held that the statute was
overbroad and unconstitutional because it attempted to ban material
that was neither obscene under the law nor exploiting real children.74
While courts have found ways to apply the existing evidence
rules to ESI generally, deepfakes pose a new and complicated challenge
to the authentication process. The relatively low bar for authentication
may be insufficient as deepfakes continue to rise in prominence. Social
media content, in particular, has forced more scrutiny on the sufficiency
of current authentication rules.
2. Authentication of Social Media Evidence
Because deepfakes are often obtained and shared on social
media, a look at the authentication standards for social media
evidence is instructive. Over the last decade, courts have taken differing
approaches to social media evidence authentication. Some jurisdictions,
like Maryland, have created a higher bar for authenticating social
media content.75 Others, like Texas, have treated social media
evidence the same as any other content, thus requiring less proof of
authenticity.76
Under the higher-bar Maryland approach, courts have noted
the ease with which false information can be created through
fictitious accounts or unauthorized access to real accounts.77 While
71.
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242–43 (2002).
72.
See id. at 242.
73.
See id.
74.
See id. at 256–58.
75.
See Brendan W. Hogan, Note, Griffin v. State: Setting the Bar Too High for
Authenticating Social Media Evidence, 71 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 61, 61 (2012).
76.
See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
77.
See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421 (Md. 2011).
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circumstantial evidence about “distinctive characteristics” of the
evidence sometimes suffices for authenticity for other types of evidence,
social media evidence cannot be authenticated merely by the name and
biographical details of the account holder.78 Rather, courts have
enumerated three methods of authenticating social media evidence.
First, a witness with requisite knowledge can testify that the social
media evidence is what it claims to be.79 Second, an expert can perform
computer forensic searches of the device used to create the content to
identify where the content originated.80 Third, the social media website
itself can directly provide some evidence that links a profile to the
person or the content to its creator.81
Griffin v. State, which established the Maryland approach,
involved a MySpace comment that the state attempted to authenticate
only through the testimony of the investigator who found it online.82
However, the state failed to get testimony of the post’s author or other
witnesses with knowledge of its creation and thus failed to authenticate
the evidence.83 Similar authentication issues have arisen in other
jurisdictions. For example, in United States v. Vayner, the US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a conviction for
unlawful transfer of a falsified identification document after the lower
court improperly admitted a social media page printout.84 A key issue
during the trial was whether the defendant could be linked to the Gmail
account that sent a forged birth certificate.85 The government presented
a printout of a profile page from a Russian social media site akin to
Facebook as its key piece of evidence.86 The printout contained the
defendant’s image and a version of his name.87 It also contained a
username for Skype, a video-messaging platform, and the Gmail
address that matched the one that sent the forged document.88 In
attempting to authenticate the document, the government presented
testimony from the special agent who accessed the profile via the
internet.89 But the government presented no evidence that the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 423–24.
See id. at 427.
See id. at 427–28.
See id. at 428.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 423–24.
United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 132.
See id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 127–28.

446

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:2:433

defendant created the profile, that the platform confirms user identities
for profiles, or that the Gmail account listed in the profile belonged to
the defendant.90 Therefore, the evidence did not establish that the
document was genuine and was too speculative to support “a reasonable
conclusion that this page was created by the defendant or on his
behalf.”91 The court then held the error was not harmless, and vacated
and remanded the case.92
Notably, the Vayner court did not state what kind of evidence
would have sufficed to authenticate the social media printout. Instead,
the court merely noted that many ways exist to authenticate documents
and no type or quantum of authentication evidence is expressly defined
in the Federal Rules of Evidence.93 The profile page at issue was a
key piece of evidence corroborating another witness’s story, and the
government did not do enough to show that the defendant created the
page or that it accurately reflected his Gmail account address.94
By contrast, the Maryland approach ultimately creates a higher
bar, requiring the proponent of social media evidence to prove its
authenticity through more definitive means such as the testimony of
the creator, a forensic expert, or the hosting platform.95 Biographical
data on the social media site and similar characteristics are not
distinctive enough to trigger the jury’s consideration of the factual basis
for claimed authenticity.96
While the Maryland approach establishes a higher bar, other
jurisdictions, like Texas, take a more flexible approach. Texas only
requires the party proffering the evidence to make a threshold showing
of authenticity.97 It is then for the fact-finder to ultimately make the
determination.98 For example, in Tienda v. Texas, the court held that
MySpace posts were properly authenticated because the state offered a
combination of circumstantial evidence to help establish that the posts
were made by the defendant.99 These facts included multiple distinctive
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 133.
Id.
See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (Md. 2011); see also Hogan, supra note 75, at

79.
96.
See Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Melissa M. O’Toole-Loureiro,
Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 448 (2013) (describing cases
that have excluded social media evidence, or evidence as to its purported authenticity, due to a
lack of threshold showing).
97.
See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
98.
Id. at 638.
99.
Id. at 645.
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photographs of the defendant, references to specific facts and people,
and the listing of the defendant’s email address.100 Based on these
facts, the court held that this circumstantial evidence, taken as a
whole, “justif[ied] admitting the evidence and submitting the ultimate
question of authenticity to the jury.”101
The Texas approach thus avoids elevating the standard for
admissibility of social media evidence above the usual approach
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The authentication of social
media evidence is a determination based on whether there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the evidence is
authentic. But courts have “historically considered admissibility of
all documentary evidence on a continuum, in which clearly authentic
evidence is admitted, clearly inauthentic evidence is excluded, and
everything in between is conditionally relevant and admitted for the
jury to determine its authenticity.”102 The Federal Rules of Evidence
thus already function in a way that allows jurors to ascertain the
authenticity of evidence when it is not clearly authentic or inauthentic.
In this way, the higher bar in the Maryland approach has been
criticized as too onerous, while the more flexible Texas approach is
touted as sufficient even for the new developments in how we create
and share electronic content.103
B. Finding Middle Ground for Assessing Deepfake Evidence
The flexible standard used by the Texas approach for
authenticating digital evidence, and specifically social media evidence,
presupposes that jurors will have enough circumstantial evidence to
reasonably judge authenticity. With deepfakes, simply identifying the
source of a video or audio and leaving jurors to use their senses to gauge
genuineness may not suffice, particularly as deepfakes become more
sophisticated.104 Thus, the Texas approach may prove too lenient to deal
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 647; accord People v. Valdez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 632–34 (2011).
102.
Grimm et al., supra note 96, at 456–57 (advocating for the more flexible approach to
social media evidence authentication).
103.
See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 75; John Patzakis, Delaware Court Affirms Conviction
Based on Facebook Evidence, NEXT GENERATION EDISCOVERY L. & TECH BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014, 9:45
AM), https://blog.x1discovery.com/tag/tienda-v-state/ [https://perma.cc/Q8RW-MD5L] (stating
that the authentication test from Tienda, the 2012 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case, has
become the majority view in the United States).
104.
See Elizabeth Caldera, “Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and Ears”: Deepfakes and the
Law of Virtual Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 189 (2019) (explaining some of the subtle
ways deepfake content can be used, like lack of blinking by the subject, but noting that the
technology will make it even harder to rely on visual clues in the future).
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with the new threat of deepfakes. Something more rigorous than the
Texas approach is necessary.
The Maryland approach, however, may be too high a bar. For
example, it may be inefficient to require analysis of metadata and the
use of technology experts in many cases. Deepfake detectors may be
costly, requiring computer forensics or other expert analysis. Further,
while detecting deepfakes through technology is certainly possible, it is
imperfect, especially as deepfake technology continues to advance.105 A
blanket requirement for forensic expert testimony would unnecessarily
increase the cost of litigation. The struggle thus becomes finding
cost-effective tools for weeding out deepfakes while maintaining rigor
in gauging authentication, veracity, and balancing the video image’s
relevance with its unfair prejudice.
The solution may thus lie in a middle-ground approach that
redefines the quantity and quality of circumstantial evidence necessary
for a reasonable jury to determine authenticity in the age of deepfakes.
Some courts have noted that social media evidence contains an inherent
risk of falsification.106 Now, more than ever, the risk of convincing fakes
is on the rise with the democratization of deepfakes. Simply relying on
basic human perception no longer suffices with this new genre of
falsehoods. Perhaps this is best illustrated with aural evidence. The
current version of Rule 901 contemplates lay opinion identifying a
voice as the alleged speaker, without taking into account the reality
that current deepfake technology can accurately simulate a speaker’s
voice.107 Even an individual familiar with another person’s voice can be
easily fooled by a deepfake audio clip. Thus, it is important that other
circumstantial evidence is presented to authenticate some audio clips
to allow a reasonable jury to determine admissibility.
Under this middle-ground approach, circumstantial evidence
should provide particular context of how a video or image originated,

105.
See Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep
Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882,
889 (2019) (describing how technologists cannot solve all of our deepfake-related problems); Nina
I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 57–58
(2020) (noting that some sort of flagging technology could be developed to detect deepfakes but
would be an incomplete fix without greater media literacy, platform social responsibility, and other
solutions); Chesney & Citron, supra note 28, at 1787–88 (noting how PhotoDNA or similar
technology for deepfake detection is underdeveloped and may not be a feasible solution to the
prevalence of deepfakes more broadly); Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit
One of the Oldest Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 353–55 (2019) (describing how the private
sector can help counter deepfakes).
106.
See State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (noting how easy it is to
fake social media content due to lack of security on platforms).
107.
See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).

2021]

AUTHENTICATION OF DEEPFAKE EVIDENCE

449

who it purports to depict, and what features of the video or
image support authenticity—without necessarily requiring computer
forensics and analysis in every case. Testimony of those with knowledge
may become even more important. But judges will need to assume a
strong gatekeeping role to ensure that the quantum of circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for a jury to make a more nuanced decision about
authenticity in the age of deepfakes.108 A special jury instruction about
visual and audio clues for detecting deepfakes may be helpful in some
situations.109 A middle-ground approach should promote fairness and
efficiency without creating too high a bar in most cases. Fortunately,
the Federal Rules of Evidence already contemplate balancing
competing concerns to arrive at the truth and, with appropriate
standards for authenticity, potential deepfakes will be less likely to
108.
See generally FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that the court has the responsibility to
decide any preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence).
109.
Juries are often instructed on how to gauge the credibility of witnesses. For example,
the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit uses a model jury instruction that states:
In deciding what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and
what testimony you do not believe. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the
witnesses. “Credibility” means whether a witness is worthy of belief. You may believe
everything a witness says or only part of it or none of it. In deciding what to believe,
you may consider a number of factors, including the following:
(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things the
witness testifies to;
(2) the quality of the witness’s understanding and memory;
(3) the witness’s manner while testifying;
(4) whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case or any motive,
bias or prejudice;
(5) whether the witness is contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote
before trial or by other evidence;
(6) how reasonable the witness’s testimony is when considered in the light of other
evidence that you believe; and
(7) any other factors that bear on believability.
[The weight of the evidence to prove a fact does not necessarily depend on the number
of witnesses who testify. What is more important is how believable the witnesses were,
and how much weight you think their testimony deserves.]
COMM. ON MODEL CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THIRD CIR., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § Ch.
1.7 (2018). For videos, images, and audio evidence that needs to be authenticated with
circumstantial evidence, the court may opt to include a special jury instruction that explains some
criteria that the jurors can use to determine if they believe the evidence purports to be what it
claims it is. See Agnes E. Venema & Zeno J. Geradts, Digital Forensics, Deepfakes, and the Legal
Process, 16 SCITECH LAW. 14, 17 (2020). Aspects like lighting, blinking, and editing clues can be
included as factors. See Caldera, supra note 104 (explaining some of the subtle ways deepfake
content can be used, like lack of blinking by the subject, but noting that the technology will make
it even harder to rely on visual clues in the future). Unfortunately, a jury instruction about ways
to spot deepfakes may become obsolete as technology advances. But some sort of detailed guidance
for the jury on gauging authenticity may be warranted, at least as a short-term solution.
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corrupt the litigation process. This middle-ground approach balances
emerging evidentiary needs in the era of deepfakes; it elevates the
traditional standard above a basic, flexible approach, which will fail to
protect the court against the threat of deepfakes in litigation, while also
avoiding an unduly high bar.
IV. CONCLUSION
Deepfake technology has created new challenges in litigation,
particularly as to authentication of video and audio evidence. While
some courts impose a higher bar for admitting social media evidence,
others take a flexible approach that applies the existing Federal Rules
of Evidence with little or no modification to account for the ease with
which false information is created and shared on social media. Now,
with the advent of deepfakes, a more rigorous approach to authenticity
will be necessary.
This Article suggests that a middle-ground approach that
rests between the current Maryland and Texas standards. This
approach would recognize that deepfakes pose unique challenges to
the truth-seeking aim of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While an
across-the-board heightened standard of authentication for digital
evidence is not warranted, a higher bar may be required in some
cases. A middle-ground approach would mandate that sufficient
circumstantial evidence—both as to quantum and quality—be
presented to the jury whenever the jury is asked to ascertain the
authenticity of digital video and audio evidence. By requiring this
middle-ground approach, the Federal Rules of Evidence can ensure
jurors have sufficient evidence to gauge the authenticity of increasingly
convincing deepfakes that threaten to undermine the justice system.

